Global Defense Integrity Forum
Presented by: Sun-hi Lee, TI-Korea Chairperson
As an ex-minister of DAPA and the current chair of TI-Korea, I would like to present my personal view on the following questions. Besides the findings of GI by DI-DSP, there are more analyses on corruption risks in the Korean defense sector.
1. In terms of corruption risk management, what are the strengths & weaknesses of the Korean defense sector? (300 words)
1) Strengths – Corruption control: TI-Korea’s study found that transparency of the defense sector has dramatically improved and corruption risks have decreased since the launch of the Defense Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA) in 2006. This view is supported by the results of annual surveys conducted by the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC). – Anti-corruption system: TI-Korea’s study mentioned the anti-corruption system was relatively well-prepared by-laws, regulations, policies, organizations, and education programmes. DAPA – Partnership and inclusion of civil society: DAPA’s ombudsmen have played an important role in promoting transparency, accountability, and integrity in defense acquisition since they are investigating civil complaints and asking correction or audit of cases to the head of DAPA. Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) recently organized the Council for Defense Integrity1.
2) Weaknesses
– Low level of freedom of information: TI-Korea’s study suggested that the current low level of freedom of information should be improved. As an example, PSPD, a major CSO in Korea, criticized that MND did not provide any information on the evaluation reports on Korean Multi-Purpose Helicopter (KMH) project. Finally, the project failed after 15 years of no disclosure of information. TI-Korea’s study also did point out the same problem in the defense sector. Due to the distinctiveness of the military and defense sector, ‘closed’ culture obstructs transparency, fairness, and justice within this area.
– The collusion of companies with (former) public officers: In 2015, Joint Unit which investigated corruption cases in defense acquisition programme mentioned deep-rooted collusion of private entities with public officers as a major cause of defense sector corruption. Some former public officers who regulated or made decisions on military purchases work for the companies later. This kind of collusion was criticized by TIKorea as a symptom of ‘delayed corruption’. TI-DSP’s GI 2015 mentioned this as well.
1 The Council for Defense Integrity has members from various civil society organizations, high level officers from defense sector companies and their councils, deputy minister of MND (as co-chair), deputy commissioners of DAPA and MMA (Military Manpower Administration), and deputy heads of DTaQ (Defense Agency for Technology and Quality) and ADD (Agency for Defense Development).
2. Please share your experience/challenges of engaging Korean defense sector (the civil society and the military interactions). (300 words)
1) Inclusion and leadership of civil society: In the past, lack of transparency, dispersed organizational management and insufficiently rational operation of the financial resources in the existing acquisition system led to inefficiency and to weaken the competitiveness of the defense sector. From 2003, Korean government sought a fundamental reform plan to overcome these problems. The committee for System Improvement in Defense Acquisition was formed under then Prime Minister, ex-chairperson of TI-Korea. TI-Korea’s recommendations on adopting Integrity Pact and independent ombudsmen system were accepted. As a result of continuous efforts, Defense Acquisition Programme Act was legislated. Accordingly, DAPA was launched in 2006 in order to strengthen transparency, efficiency, and expertise of the defense acquisition and to empower the competitiveness of Korean defense industry. DAPA is playing an important role in promoting transparency, accountability, and integrity of defense sector. TI-Korea’s recommendations of candidates for DAPA’s ombudsmen were accepted for the most part.
2) Whistle-blowers: In Korean defense sector, whistle-blowers played a very important role. However, they were not effectively protected. In spite of well-prepared legal provisions, in reality there are still many hurdles in front of them within organizations as well as within society. TI-Korea’s study emphasized that effective protection for whistle-blowers is essential to promote integrity of the sector.
3) Deep-rooted collusion: It is not easy to terminate deep-rooted collusion between the public (ex-)officials (of MND and related public institutions) and the private companies within short period of time. Instead, extended efforts should be put into eradicating the collusion. One major remedy can be found from independent(!) civil society monitoring through civil participation. This is why MND, DAPA, DTaQ, and other agencies are inviting civil society leaders as their ombudsmen.
3. Looking ahead, what’s your insights/suggestions to advocate defense integrity in Korean military? (400 words)
1) Invisible corruption: In the Korean defense sector, controlling visible corruption (direct bribery, entertainment, trading in influence, abuse of functions, etc.) has been quite successful in the past two decades. However, people believe that invisible corruption (policy capture, indirect bribery, collusion, influence exercise, etc.) is still rampant. Corruption should not be restricted within the realm of bribery. There is still a possibility of defense policy capture under the guise of legitimacy. For example, the military-industry-academia complex surrounding the acquisition of the weapon systems can be distorted to support a ‘special’ one by using tax-payers’ money inefficiently. There can be also politicians who want to make biased decisions, policies, regulations, or laws. In Korea, there were so many grand corruption cases in the sector, however, most of them were labelled as ‘legal’ at the time of their introduction and came into surface as ‘grand corruption’ later. It is important to prevent this type of ‘invisible and intelligent corruption’.
2) Participation of civil society: In Korean defense sector, there are many cases of successful inclusion of civil society. However, it is just the beginning. Civil society’s participation and activities as an independent stakeholder should be promoted to ensure transparency, accountability, and integrity. CSO’s increased and stronger participation is the key to obtaining might of military power, citizens’ trust in defense, as well as global reputation.
3) Compliance of companies: There are views of companies and interested officials that consider various devices to ensure transparency and integrity as regulations on work efficiency. In a short period of time, they will enjoy success without transparency and integrity. In the long term, however, they will meet reputation risks as well as legal and political risks. Businesses should also comply with laws, regulations, and basic principles of fairness and integrity. Only those companies can succeed in a sustainable way.
4) Protection of reporters: Witnesses, experts, and victims of corruption should be protected appropriately as well as corruption reporters. Moreover, they should be rewarded and awarded if possible, as the Korean legal system supports. Without their efforts, corruption cases cannot be easily exposed. In addition, society should respect them as integrity builders and corruption fighters.
5) The Magic triangle (Civil Society-Private-Public Coalition): Dr. Peter Eigen, the founder of TI, called “a joint effort from the government, the private sector and CSOs” as the Magic Triangle.2 In 2005, the Korean Pact on Anti-Corruption and Transparency (K-PACT) was signed by the representatives from four sectors (public, political, private sectors and civil society). This kind of coalition-making initiative intends to convert collusion of the past into coalition for the future. Those players can together approach common goals through different action plans of each sector.
Presented on: July 23-24, 2019 Global Defense Integrity Forum held in Taiwan