Recently, it was exposed that the retired researchers from the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) have been leaking military secrets. So, the ADD has assured us to take the matter seriously and provide an adequate policy to prevent later incidents. However, it is seemingly that the ADD identifies the problem as a personnel issue. The higher authorities, such as The Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), are taking the same stance while. The other relevant government departments, including the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Defense Security Support Command (DSSC), are also indifferent to the matter, stepping back from responsibilities. Moreover, when there was a hacking issue with the ADD, the only action made was reprimanding those who were directly involved. If this continues, the government will keep facing the same problem while missing the boat, and thus there must be a more fundamental and practical measure to prevent this type of incident from happening.
The ADD was established in 1970, under the value of “self-reliant national defense”, for the research and development of military weapons in Korea. For 50 years, the ADD has been at the forefront of advancing military technologies involving warships, aircrafts, missiles, and high-tech electronics. Later, the defense acquisition program was endorsed as a pre-requisite for the “self-reliant defense”, leading the development of heavy chemical industry, and it was clear that the program was implemented in various fields to improve private sector technology.
After years, as science and technology have become a breakthrough, the private sector took over the control of the defense acquisition. In other countries with high defense spending, including the U.S.A, private defense companies are responsible for the research and development of defense technology, and not the governments. However, in Korea, R&D is still under the government (ADD) management, and it has become one of the leading causes of military corruption. As the ADD mostly manages defense development, the defense companies are highly dependent on the government and eager to acquire military secrets. It is almost inevitable for the defense companies that the retired researchers of the ADD are considered as ‘first in line’ in hiring. The retired researchers, on the other side, are risking themselves to offer military secrets that the companies require to get a better payment.
Although there are substantial restrictions on confidentiality, re-employment, and registering properties for former defense officials, the ADD researchers are relatively free from any integrity obligations, despite that they treat a wide range of military secrets.
Moreover, the command structure shows that the DAPA controls the ADD. However, the president of ADD is concurrently the minister of MND, while the minister of MND has the power to nominate the president of ADD. Thus, it is impossible for the DAPA, which is directly under the MND, to take active control over the ADD.
To this problem, we suggest the following:
1. The government should entrust private sectors (i.e., defense companies) with Defense Research and Development (R&D) to enhance national competitiveness and minimize the possibility of secret leaks.
2. Strong integrity laws should be applied to the ADD researchers, depending on the level of military secrets, equally with the relevant public officials and officers in defense acquisition.
3. All rights of command and control, including the budget and personnel authorities, should be assigned to the Minister of DAPA, establishing an independent command relationship to take active control over the ADD.
4. To achieve the above suggestions, there should be a drastic change in the Act on the Agency for Defense Development and the defense acquisition laws.
14. May. 2020
Transparency International Korea Chapter
Sung-Goo Kang, Sang-Hak Lee, Toe Hyu, Co-chairpersons
Translated by: Sohjung Lee